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Abstract: 
 
In 1936, while Sweden gave birth to one of the most peaceful solutions to class 
conflict (i.e. the Neo-Corporatist Welfare State) with the iconic signature of the 
Saltsjöbaden Accord, Spain gave birth to the most violent results: the Spanish Civil 
War. Why did the political, social and economic elites choose collaboration in 
Sweden and violent confrontation in Spain? Building on recent findings by economic 
historians, this paper shows the notable socio-economic similarities between the two 
countries: with European-record levels of social conflict, both were also late 
industrialist economies enjoying remarkable growth rates as well as decreasing levels 
of economic inequalities. The paper underlines an overlooked factor: the public 
bureaucracy. In the key decades of state expansion (late 19th-early 20th century), the 
semi-authoritarian Sweden – where executive and administrative positions, firmly in 
hands of the Crown, were unaccountable to the parliament – created and consolidated 
a meritocratic autonomous bureaucracy which promoted impartiality and the rule of 
law. On the contrary, the instable and, on average, more liberal Spain – where 
executive and administrative positions were frequently accountable to parliamentary 
dynamics – built a patronage-based administration which allowed successive political 
incumbents to implement their most preferred policies above the rule of law. This 
made that in 1936, facing a leftist government extensively violating property rights, 
the Spanish capitalist and middle-classes, until then the least supportive of fascism in 
Europe, actively supported Franco’s military rebellion, which ended up becoming one 
of the longest fascist regimes in the history. 
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A Counterfactual Comparison of Spain and Sweden  
In hindsight, history often looks self-evident. Explaining different national trajectories 
during the 20th century in Europe, we usually take the peaceful and largely harmonious 
development of the Nordic countries for granted while seeing the brutal and bloody 
development of Spain as more or less a “natural” outcome of its historically inherited 
social and economic structure. In this article, we take a different view, inspired by the 
counterfactual approach to political events and combining this with the comparative case 
study method (Kiser and Levi 1996).  
The counterfactual approach rests on searching after factors that never did occur 
but could have existed in a stream of events that led to a certain outcome.  Since such 
counterfactuals can not be found in any archives or historical documents, the researcher 
in this approach needs a theory or a model that "will enable him to deduce a 
counterfactual situation from institutions and relationships that actually existed" (Fogel 
1964, p. 224.) In this admittedly speculative approach, researchers have to justify their 
claim that the outcome of the historical process could have been different by presenting 
arguments for how and why things could have developed in a different way. Such 
arguments rest on making it plausible that if the postulated variable had taken on some 
“value different from the one that is assumed in the actual world,” (Tetlock and Belkin 
1996, p. 6) , the outcome would have been different. The relevance of this approach thus 
hinges on making such counterfactuals plausible.  
This is where the comparative case study approach enters the picture. The logic is 
that if it is possible to find a case B with a different outcome than case A, but for which it 
is not unreasonable or implausible to state that at the beginning of the process, case B had 
many features resembling case A, the hypothetical existence of a counterfactual can be 
made plausible. For example, it makes little sense to argue that if Napoleon would have 
had nuclear weapons at Waterloo, he would not have been defeated. However, using the 
comparative case method, one could argue that if he would have used the same military 
tactics as he did at Austerlitz, or as the Carthage army did at Cannae, Napoleon would 
have won at Waterloo. Since this (maybe) would have been within the reach of his 
command, this is a more justifiable counterfactual approach. As this simple example 
shows, the task for the researchers in the counterfactual approach is then to show that a) 
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this other tactic could have been used and b) if it had been, the outcome would in all 
likelihood been different. The comparative case method increases the probability that the 
researcher will come across counterfactuals that are not obvious if one concentrates on 
the single case. The counterfactual approach is thus a way to come to grasp with 
historical explanations that are over-determined by structural factors and that do not give 
any room for explanations that points at, for example, the strategic choices made by 
agents or how they operate to change existing or create new institutional settings.  
Interwar Europe was a time with intense political conflicts and dramatic clashes 
between the left and the right. However, the result of these confrontations varied 
dramatically from the establishment of Leninist and then Stalinist communism in Russia, 
Fascism in Austria, Germany and Italy, civil war in Spain and peaceful reconciliation 
between organized labour, the farmers’ movement and capital in the Scandinavian 
countries. The year when the Spanish war started, 1936, was also the year when the 
famous Saltsjöbaden Accord was signed between the Swedish Trade Union movement 
and the Swedish Employers’ federation which became the backbone for the country’s 
uniquely long period of peaceful and productive collaboration between the parties on the 
labour market and the state. Thus in this year, while Sweden was giving birth to the 
probably most admired solution to the class-based type of social conflict worldwide (the 
Neo-Corporatist Welfare State), Spain gave birth to the most despised one (Civil War). 
By comparing these two extreme cases using the counterfactual approach we hope 
to shed light on factors that have not been obvious in the many analyses – mostly, case-
studies – that have sought to explain these different countries’ historical trajectories. In 
particular, our interest is if such a comparison would make it possible to find out some 
variable (i.e, the counterfactuals) that may have been neglected in explaining the outbreak 
of the Spanish Civil War (SCW). Even if the SCW probably has provoked more books 
than any other civil war (Beevor 2002: 7), numerous questions remain open to debate. 
Many of them have of course been (and still are) subject to ideologically charged 
controversies (Stradling 2008, Payne 2006). The central dilemma in the debate is why 
Spain, a semi-prosperous parliamentary democracy, entered in such a spiral of political 
radicalization conductive to some of the most horrendous episodes of violence, by both 
leftish and rightist extremists, in the history of Western countries? 
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While the literature has extensively emphasized all the usual suspects as 
determinants of the SCW – e.g. the international system and the influence of foreign 
powers; the acute socio-economic, ethno-linguistic or religious cleavages; and the weak 
democratic or liberal tradition –, the characteristics of the Spanish state and its 
bureaucracy have mostly been overlooked. To start with, by Spanish administrative 
scholars themselves, who have tended to regard the Spanish bureaucracy during the 
Republic as a “quite pond” in a tumultuous environment (Nieto 1976, p.567). The goal of 
this paper is to underline the importance of two interconnected characteristics of the 
Spanish bureaucratic state for explaining the collapse of the democratic Republic: the 
lack of rule of law based on the concept of impartiality and the extensive patronage in 
personnel policies. 
In doing so, we also depart from the traditional approach to the SCW – mostly 
based on a single case-study methodology. We adopt instead a more comparative 
perspective, selecting according to the main relevant independent variable (i.e. the 
bureaucratic structure). As a consequence, we explore the different approach to politics of 
the state and the rule of law in two countries, Sweden and Spain, which, on the one hand, 
experienced similar levels of social conflict but, on the other, had inherited very different 
bureaucratic structures and perspectives on the importance of the rule of law. In the 
second half of the 19th century, the semi-authoritarian Swedish state – where executive 
and administrative positions, firmly in hands of the Crown, were not controlled by the 
parliament – created and consolidated a meritocratic autonomous bureaucracy which was 
centered on the respect for impartiality and the rule of law (Rothstein 1998). On the 
contrary, the instable and, on average, more liberal and democratic Spanish state – where 
executive and administrative positions were frequently controlled by parliamentary 
dynamics – built a patronage-based administration where either liberal or conservative 
incumbents consolidated one of the most extensive “spoils system” in the Western world 
– the so called cesantía system in the literature (Jiménez-Asensio 1989: 42;  Parrado 
2000: 252). 
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Spain and Sweden: more “similar cases” than at first sight 
A first issue we must address is why Sweden in the 1930s, where the foundations of the 
harmonious Neo-Corporatist Welfare State were laid down as a solution to social 
conflict, may represent an appropriate comparative counterfactual to 1930s Spain, where 
social conflict escalated into the most violent forms. A quick intuitive objection to this 
comparison would be to underline the historically divergent cultural approaches to 
violence across Europe, and specially between the more peaceful Nordic and the more 
violence-ridden Southern-Mediterranean societies. Nevertheless, the peacefulness of the 
Nordic countries can be questioned by pointing at the numerous, although frequently 
overlooked in the comparative historiography, examples of violent social conflicts in 
those societies.  
The clearest case would be the gruesome civil war that took place in Finland in 
1918 between “reds” and “whites”. This war, in which many Swedish speaking Finns 
took part specially at high levels of command, contained horrible atrocities against 
unarmed civilians, summary mass executions of enemy combatants, interference from 
outside military forces and the use of concentration camps in which after the war had 
ended the winning side let thousands of soldiers and civilians from the losing side starve 
to death (Roselius 2009; Ylikangas 1995). According to recent estimations, more than 
one percent of the total Finish population lost their lives in the 1918 civil war. This 
makes the Finish conflict, if any, even more dramatic than the Spanish one since, despite 
a very similar proportion of population died, Spain lost those lives over a period of three 
years, not three months (Ylikangas 1998). Episodes of class violence were also frequent 
during the first decades of the 20th century in other Scandinavian countries. As late as 
1931, the Swedish military fired against protesting unarmed workers killing five persons 
(Johansson 2001). Going further back in history, violent conflict was as systemic in the 
Nordic countries as in other parts of Europe. Denmark and Sweden were arch enemies 
who fought ten bloody wars between the 15th and the beginning of the 19th century and 
were both involved in most of the major continental wars that took place. 
When the modern industrial era starts the historically warlike Sweden, similar to 
Spain, had been reduced from a major to a minor European power. If Spain had lost most 
of its colonies, Sweden lost not only its conquests on the European continent but also, in 
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1809, a great portion of what was considered the Swedish national territory, Finland, 
which had been an integrated part of the country for six-hundred years.  
 As well, it can be argued that comparing a Nordic (and traditionally over-
achieving) European country like Sweden with a Mediterranean (and traditionally under-
achieving) one like Spain neglects their historically notable political, legal and 
administrative differences. Many divergences may be pointed out: the unequal adoption 
of the Roman law, the opposite way local communities were internally organized and 
externally integrated into higher forms of political power during the late Middle Ages or 
the diverse form of parliamentary representation of social classes during the Modern Era 
(Ertman 1997). Nevertheless, in relation to the key independent variable in this study – 
the bureaucratic structure of the state – as an increasing body of evidence indicates, the 
similarities in terms of patronage between the early 19th century state apparatuses of 
Sweden (or other Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon country) and those of Spain (or other 
Mediterranean country) were as striking as their differences at the end of the 19th 
century.1 History matters, but some historical periods may matter more than others and 
we argue here, following comparative literature on state formation (e.g. Silberman 1993, 
North, Weingast and Wallis 2009) that the decisive decades in state formation from the 
mid-19th century to the early 20th century mattered specially.  
Regarding cultural or religious differences – such as Protestant vs. Catholic 
ethics, higher vs. lower levels social trust or particularistic vs. universalistic political 
cultures – our defense is weaker, since it is inherently difficult to falsify cultural 
explanations. Nevertheless, as also recent studies, including experimental research, 
indicate, cultural variables that we tend to assign to deeply rooted characteristics, such as 
a given level of generalized trust, may be the result, and not so much the cause, of a 
certain type of state (Rothstein and Stolle 2008, Rothstein and Eek 2009). In other words, 
this research indicates that it is more likely that the “virtuous” characteristics of the 
Swedish society, such as its well-known high level of social trust, to be the result of 
impartial state institutions than vice versa. In the relatively corrupt-ridden 19th century it 
                                                 
1 For an overview of how early 19th century patronage-ridden administrations evolved worldwide, see 
Silberman’s (1993) Cages of Reason. Rothstein (1998) and Lapuente (2007) offer detailed accounts of the 
19th century evolution of the Swedish and the Spanish administrations respectively.  
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is plausible to assume that a corrupt state biased towards the interests of some privileged 
groups was, at least, not helping (and likely undermining) social trust.  
The vast majority of scholarly as well as popular accounts of the SCW tend to 
explain the high degree of political radicalization in 1930s Spain as the result of an 
“objective” economic structure and/or social conflict.2 In general, some specific 
characteristics of the economy are thought to have given rise to an elevated socio-
economic conflict. These characteristics should be, although scholars tend to downplay a 
bit this aspect, significantly different from other European countries which did not share 
the Spanish violent experience. One pervasive argument is that the 1930s Spanish 
polarized politics would simply mirror – or amplify – a deeply-rooted socio-economic 
polarization in the economy and in particular in the agricultural sector.  
Against this prevailing view it should be noted, in the first place, that the 
existence of relatively advanced social conditions did not preclude many interwar 
European countries from experiencing violent authoritarian takeovers. For instance, it is 
frequently remarked the disastrous political consequences for the fate of interwar 
democracies of having a large percentage of the labour force in the agricultural sector. 
That would be, for example, the case of Spain or Italy, where people working in the 
agriculture (many of them peasants) presented a 56 percent of the total labor force in the 
middle of the interwar period. Landless agricultural workers would be more easily 
persuaded to join either revolutionary or fascist movements. However, when we compare 
the weight of the agrarian sector in the failing interwar democracies with that of the 
surviving ones,3 no apparent pattern emerges. As a matter of fact, some of the countries 
which experienced the most notorious fascists or authoritarian takeovers had some of the 
smallest agricultural labour forces in Europe, such as Germany (30.7%) or Austria 
(31.9%). Generally speaking, there seems to be no clear relation between the level of 
“sophistication” of the economic structure of an European interwar democracy and its 
                                                 
2 It is impossible to summarize here what probably constitutes the largest bibliography on the causes of a 
civil war. Some classical accounts would be Preston (1994) The coming of the Spanish Civil War; Thomas  
(1977) The Spanish Civil War, Carr (1971) The Republic and the Civil War in Spain or Brenan (1943) The 
Spanish labyrinth.  Stradling (2007) offers – and critically reviews – a selection of recent bibliography that 
would fall within the category of counts within the category of ‘Revisionist’ History.  
3 Out of the 28 states of the Western world, 26 possessed parliamentary democracies in 1920. By 1938, 16 
of the 26 countries had succumbed to dictatorship (Mann 1993:2). 
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probabilities of survival, as Luebbert’s (1987) pioneering attack on simple structuralist 
explanations shows. 
Similarly, this paper argues that the existence of a high level of social conflict 
between organized social classes does not need to lead to civil conflict. The reason is that 
when it comes to economic conflicts, the main issue parties are in conflict about – money 
– can be endlessly divided. This is contrary to ethnic and religious conflicts which are 
“either or” values. Conflicts about a value that can be endlessly divided should, we argue, 
give rise to processes characterized by negotiations instead of open violence since these 
conflicts are not “either-or” games and usually also not “zero-sum” games (Rothstein 
2005). In a conflict of interests between workers organized in unions and employers’ 
organizations, both types of institutions have much to lose if the conflict results in strikes 
or blockades since such open conflicts are very costly for the organizations. For example, 
judging by the number of days of production lost to due to industrial dispute, Sweden 
had, from 1890 to the mid-1930s more social conflict than any other Western country 
(Åmark 1992). Yet, precisely because of those circumstances, actors in Sweden came to 
realize that constant industrial conflicts – strikes, blockades, boycotts and lockouts – were 
extremely costly for them. Moreover, they also saw that in the end, almost all conflicts 
resulted in negotiations about a new contract. From this came a mutual understanding that 
both parties had much to win if it would be possible to reach such a new contract without 
having to take to open conflicts. The labor-capital conflict obviously remained, but from 
1936 onwards the parties found out that they had a mutual interest in avoiding the high 
costs of open conflicts (Rothstein 2005).  
Spain, with a level of economic backwardness of semi-prosperous Western 
country (closer to 1930s Sweden than to 1917 Russia), and with a level of industrial 
conflict at least not higher than other strike-ridden societies that managed to establish a 
social compromise to “deactivate” the economic class struggle such as Sweden, Spain 
came to suffer the most backward form of conflict – a brutal and enormously costly civil 
war. On both sides, extensive episodes of violence took place against non-combatant 
civilians who simply happened to think differently. An adequate account of the Spanish 
extremely violent outcome requires explaining why the social, economic and political 
elites of the Spanish Republic, unlike their counterparts in several other European 
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countries, were not able to deactivate this social conflict and propose compromising 
solutions that would have benefitted all in comparison with what happened.  
It can be argued that, in retrospect, it is easy to state that the armed solution 
produced the worst outcome for (almost) all relevant social and political forces, but that, 
ex ante, given the high degree of uncertainty and informational problems, both main left 
and right wing political forces had no other feasible alternative as to engage in open 
armed conflict. We claim that a review of the events preceding the outbreak of the civil 
war – which, as Payne (2006, p.IX) remarks, have surprisingly been subject to little 
attention given the vast bibliography on the SCW –  speaks strongly against this 
argument. A study of the statements and behaviour of relevant representatives of the civil 
society reveals numerous opportunities for compromising in which actors exhibited a 
fairly accurate level of information about the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
adopting a non-compromising extremist position. The main actors repeatedly chose 
violent confrontation over compromise/collaboration. 
For example, as late as June 7th 1936, only one month before the outbreak of the 
war, 126 local and regional employers’ associations published a manifesto in La Veu de 
Catalunya in which they showed their willingness to reach broad labor-capital 
compromise. They were ready to accept most points of the leftist Popular Front’s 
governmental economic program, including some of the most controversial labor 
regulations. It is important to bear in mind that the minister of industry, Plácido Álvarez-
Buylla, had clearly stated the government had the “educational” responsibility to change 
the terms of industrial relations (Cabrera 1983, Payne 2006). In exchange, employers’ 
organizations asked the government to pass elemental measures to keep a basic capitalist 
activity while economic interactions were subject to constant disruption. They, like many 
government officials, were conscious that capital was fleeing the country as a result of 
constant violations of property rights and the rule of law. Nevertheless, these were 
tolerated and even encouraged by government officials – specially in those provinces 
civil governorships and in the local councils. Unlike what happened in other parts of 
Europe, including Sweden, it was Spanish employers’ associations themselves the ones 
who suggested the creation of a national “labor conference”. Yet this offer, similar to 
later ones by the national chambers of commerce and industry in Madrid on June 26th and 
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July 5th in the newspaper El Sol– that is, only two weeks before the war broke out – were 
plainly rejected by the government (Payne 2006, p. 257).  
There are solid reasons to believe that, had this offer been taken seriously by the 
government, the events in the next few weeks could have been quite different. Not only 
the upper- and middle-classes would have been reluctant to join the fascist-military 
uprising that took place on July 17th, but the vast majority of military officers who 
eventually took part in it, including many of the leading figures such as Franco himself, 
would have had serious reservations to participate. As Payne (2006) extensively 
documents, “el director” of the military plot, General Mola, would probably have 
initiated the rebellion anyway given his deep convictions, yet his prospects of success, 
given the scarce resources mobilized in the preceding months, would have probably been 
even more meagre than General Sanjurjo’s 1932 failing attempt. The vast majority of 
officers were conscious of recent history of military disasters in Spain and they did not 
want to commit to a rebellion, even if headed by the charismatic Mola. As Payne (2006, 
p. 314) notes, “many would-be rebels committed themselves fully to the revolt only after 
reaching the negative conclusion that it would be more dangerous for them if they did 
not.”  
One interesting testimony that the fascist or conspiracy zeal among the majority 
of military officers was clearly lacking until the very last moment – not even days, but 
merely hours before the war’s outbreak – is that of Captain Pérez Salas. Since he 
remained loyal to the Republic during the SCW, Pérez Salas can hardly be considered a 
biased anti-Republic observer. For him, what made large numbers of officers to support 
the rebellion was not even the assassination of the rightist leader Calvo Sotelo on July 
12th, traditionally considered as the trigger of the SCW. In his own words, “in no way 
would it have been the drop of water that made the glass overflow” (Payne 2006, p. 333). 
What affected the decisions of hundreds of key rank-and-file officers was the flagrant 
violation of the rule of law embodied by the fact that it was representatives of the 
Republican public forces the ones who had committed the assassination of the opposition 
leader. For Captain Pérez Salas, “after the details were revealed and it was learned that 
the forces of public order had themselves been involved, the reaction was tremendous…It 
is futile to try to deny the importance of this fact. If the forces of public order, on whom 
 11
the rights and security of citizens depend, are capable of carrying out this kind of act, 
they effectively demonstrate their lack of discipline and obliviousness to the sacred 
mission” (ibid). It is at this point, and not earlier, when a large number of military 
officials reached the conclusion that it was more dangerous not to rebel than to rebel.  
If the capitalist classes, far from an early support for a “fascist” solution, an 
showed until the very last minute an approach at least as conciliatory as other European 
employers’ associations, something similar can be argued of their political 
representatives. This can be inferred by the conciliatory remarks by members of the 
bourgeois in the Cortes – specially of the Catalans Ventosa or Cambó – as well as by 
their recent experience in government. The relatively mild response from the centre-right 
government in the aftermath to the 1934 revolutionary insurrection, involving between 
15.000 and 30.000 armed workers, may be an illustration in this sense.  
The fighting lasted for only two weeks but caused about a thousand lives and 
huge economic costs. Several thousands workers who had taken part in the fighting were 
arrested and the initial repressive military operation had been harsh. Nevertheless, the 
retaliation against them from the authorities was, according to Beevor (2006, p. 35), 
“extremely lenient”, compared to the standards used in other European countries at this 
time. Payne (2006, p.102) goes further, arguing that “the liberality of the Spanish system 
was astounding.” Most imprisoned revolutionaries were set free already in 1935 and only 
one out of a total of twenty dead sentences was carried out, representing the mildest 
repression of a revolutionary insurrection by any either democratic or authoritarian state 
in 19th or 20th century Western Europe. While in Germany, Estonia, Italy, Hungary or 
Finland the perpetrators of the revolutionary leftish uprisings were severely repressed and 
frequently disenfranchised to take part in future elections, in Spain all the revolutionary 
organizations were allowed to continue their activities. In addition, instead of using the 
control of some key elements of the state apparatus to adopt an authoritarian turn in the 
regime to perpetuate repression as a response to organized workers’ revolutionary zeal 
(like their Italian or Hungarian counterparts), the capitalist-like political forces in Spain – 
while dominating parliamentary politics during the so-called bienio negro (1933-1936) – 
did not support any authoritarian twist and continued to abide by the Constitution.  
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Another example of the conciliatory approach of the Spanish bourgeois would be 
the government initiatives launched by the post-1934-revolution labor minister Federico 
Salmón. As a representative of the social Catholic branch of the bourgeoisie, Salmón did 
not dismantle the workers-friendly jurados mixtos (joint arbitration committees) 
established by his Socialist predecessor Largo Caballero. Instead, and similar to what 
happened in countries where the social-democratic consensus was being built, Salmón 
introduced civil servants as presidents of the jurados in a movement towards neutrality 
and effectiveness (Payne 2006, p. 108). Had they been accepted by the social actors, 
these jurados would have likely resemble more the impartial Swedish 
förlikningskommission – highly respected arbitrators by both employers and employees – 
than the mostly one-sided jurados devised by Largo Caballero. 
Nevertheless, following the general radicalization of the left forces, both the 
anarcho-syndicalist union CNT and the socialist union UGT refused to participate in the 
reformed arbitration committees. This rejection unbalanced these jurados that in other 
countries had become cornerstones to transform the social actors’ perceptions of the 
labor-capital conflict from a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game. It would also be 
premature to assign the reluctance of the unions to compromise to their historical 
unconciliatory approach. That may be true for the anarcho-syndicalist CNT who, 
nonetheless, had seen its membership shrinking from one to half million in a few years. 
Yet this cannot be argued of the Socialist UGT who presented a long history of 
collaborationist attitude in comparative perspective – including under Primo de Rivera’s 
(1923-1930) dictatorship. 
Social actors knew the potentially explosive consequences of the lack of social 
compromise. A representative of the Catalan bourgeois, Juan Ventosa, stated in April in 
the Cortes: “I call your attention the similarities between Spain and Germany”, in 
reference to the possibilities that an authoritarian takeover would happen soon in Spain 
(Payne 2006, p. 249). The editor of La Vanguardia echoed the same words a few weeks 
later: “How many votes did the fascists have in Spain in the last election? None: a 
ridiculously small amount…Today, on the other hand, travellers returning from different 
parts of the country are saying: ‘there everybody is becoming a fascist’ (…) What has 
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happened? What has happened is simply that (…) there is no government” (Payne 2006, 
p. 267). 
In sum, the Spanish bourgeois exhibited willingness to advance towards 
compromise with organized labor, although this inclination has tended to be overlooked 
for long by scholars – probably as a result of the lack of comparative edge in most 
analyses. Case-study methodology, the overwhelmingly prevalent in the studies of the 
SCW, is prone to emphasize the dynamics that directly led to the civil war (e.g. right-
wing support to the military conspiracy) and overlook the dynamics that could have led to 
peace (e.g. right-wing support to social compromise). In other words, they embody what 
some regard as one of the main pathologies of social science: the focus on the things that 
went wrong or “misery research” (Rothstein 1998, p. 62).     
 
Wby Madrid became Moscow and not Stockholm? 
This section explores the behaviour of a Spanish political elite who rejected social 
compromise. The intriguing general question is why did the representatives of the main 
political forces fail to agree in, even if very precarious, basic institutional arrangements to 
deal with the socio-economic conflict? Additionally, there are specific puzzles regarding 
the behaviour of the mainstream political parties: in the right, left and centre of the 
ideological spectrum. Firstly, in relation to the forces on the right, why did conservative 
upper-class landowners as well as many urban middle-classes rally around the fascist (or 
pseudo-fascist) solution proposed by the army rebels in July 1936? As we have seen 
above, in comparison with other Spanish parties, the large democratic right-wing political 
parties were committed to the Republican institutions until the very eve of the military 
coup itself, even when a great part of left had already adopted an explicit revolutionary 
program (Payne 2004, 2006). When the military-fascist uprising took place, the political 
forces of the right (with few exceptions, such as the Basque Nationalist) would massively 
and actively support the coup. One of the most curious paradoxes of the 20th century 
comparative politics remains thus as to why the country with probably the lowest level of 
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political support for fascism in the interwar Europe, Spain,4 ended up having one of the 
longest semi-fascist authoritarian regimes in the history (1936/39-1975). 
The political behaviour of the parliamentary left presents more intriguing puzzles. 
It is important to devote some attention to some comparative striking differences between 
the Spanish and other European mainstream Socialist parties. In Spain, experience in 
government did not have the expected moderating effect – as it would be the case in other 
European countries, such as Sweden or France – on the left forces in general and on the 
Socialist party (PSOE) in particular. This is the more surprising if we take into account 
that the Spanish Socialists occupied relevant cabinet positions in democratic governments 
– e.g. PSOE’s Largo Caballero and Prieto became ministers of labor and finance 
respectively in 1931 – before most major Socialist parties in Europe – including the 
highly influential French one. Not only that but, in addition, the Spanish socialists had 
allowed the active collaborationist position of its union UGT in the 1920s authoritarian 
regime of Primo de Rivera – an attitude directly unconceivable for most of their 
European counterparts. As Payne (2004, 2006) notes, there were important forces inside 
the PSOE who in the early 1930s argued that the party should take inspiration from the 
compromise policies used by the Scandinavian Social Democrats. Furthermore, 
historically, the PSOE had been a founding member of the social democratic Second 
International (1889) and it had mostly remained a typical party of that international 
(Payne 2004, p. 9). That is, it kept a Marxist program in theory, but its praxis was mostly 
social democratic. 
From exhibiting one of the most “collaborationist” attitudes in Europe, the 
Spanish Socialists would evolve in a short period of time into the uncompromising 
radical force that masterminded the 1934 revolutionary insurrection. PSOE and UGT’s 
radicalization, according to most observers constitutes a (or the) key element in the 
collapse of the Spanish Republic (Graham 1990, Redero San Román 1992: 15; Beevor 
2006, 34f, Payne 2004, 2006). In 1931, right after joining the government of the 
Republic, both leaders’ public statements and government program would probably put 
PSOE to the right of the French Socialists and in par ideologically with the German or 
                                                 
4 As late as five months before the SCW started, in the general elections of February 1936 the fascist party, 
Falange, obtained 46,466 votes – scarcely a 0.5% of the total (Linz and De Miguel 1977). And, at the 
outbreak of the SCW in July 1936, it only had around 10,000 affiliates. 
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Scandinavian Social Democrats (Payne 2006: 43). On the contrary, in 1933-34, right after 
abandoning power, the Spanish Socialists would be closer to a standard Bolshevik party. 
Only a few days after the electoral defeat of the left in the 1933 elections, the executive 
commissions of both PSOE and UGT agreed that, in case the right should take power, the 
Socialists “would have to rebel energetically” (Julia 1989, p.85; Payne 2006, p. 54). In 
words of several outstanding figures of the party, including Largo Caballero – often 
called the “Spanish Lenin” – the goal was now the “dictatorship of the proletariat”, 
irrespective of the violent means to achieve it. A direct quote from Largo Caballero after 
the 1934 insurrection reads: “I want a Republic without a class war, but for them to 
happen, one class has to disappear”. In the light of statements like this, as Beevor argues, 
the middle classes did not needed to be reminded “the horrors which followed the 
Russian revolution and Lenin’s determination to annihilate the bourgeoisie” (2006, p 36).  
It is important to note here that scholars point out that the radicalization of both 
the socialist party and its union happened immediately after leaving power. As Santos 
Juliá (1994, p. 181) remarks, “as soon as they lost their place in government, the leaders 
of the UGT took up the practice of the revolutionary general strike, whose manifest goal 
was no longer simply obtaining improvements for the working class, but rather the 
destruction of the Republic and the seizure of power.” Shortly after losing the November 
1933 elections, at the beginnings of 1934, Largo Caballero himself became the head a 
Revolutionary Liaison Committee in which members of the main Socialist organizations 
would start to organize an insurrection that should have “all the characteristics of a civil 
war” (Largo Caballero 1934/1985, p. 84).  
Historians emphasize that this radicalization was not a preventive reaction against 
an either authoritarian turn or an extreme pro-business attitude of the newly elected 
government – actually, headed by the moderate Alejandro Lerroux and not by the 
winners of the 1933 parliamentary elections: the right-wing Catholic CEDA. First, “no 
one indentified Lerroux with fascism” and, second, “no one, not even Lerroux, thought 
that within two months he would have to govern with the parliamentary support of the 
CEDA (Juliá 1989, 79). That is, the radicalization of the Socialists did not seem to obey 
to policy or programmatic concerns. In one of the most established historical analysis of 
the Spanish socialists (and that this paper sees key for understanding Spanish violence in 
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comparative perspective), Santos Julia shows that “it was enough for the Socialists to find 
themselves excluded from government power to announce their new political intentions” 
(ibid, 1989, 79). It seems that the Spanish Socialists valued remaining in power more 
than the objective fulfilment of their programmatic demands – at least when we compare 
them with the mainstream Socialist European parties of the second international (e.g. the 
Swedish SAP), who were able to reach social compromise while in opposition. Why?  
Before addressing that question, let’s have a look onto the possibly most puzzling 
of all political behaviours: that of the Republican parties that roughly occupied the 
centre-left and the centre-right of the ideological spectrum. They provided the politicians 
with both the greatest governmental responsibilities and the greatest veto powers, such as 
Alcalá-Zamora, Azaña, Lerroux, among other members of what essentially were middle 
class parties. It is specially surprising that this middle-class “petit-bourgeois” political 
centre did not energetically act to prevent the collapse of the Republic. Not only were 
they king-makers (the Republican Presidents, Alcalá-Zamora and Azaña, enjoyed wide 
powers to draft cabinets almost at will), but they were also “kings” in their own right, 
having an overwhelmingly strong representation in the main executive positions, from 
Prime Ministers to ministerial undersecretaries. Nevertheless, while systematically 
excluding political collaboration with moderate right-wing parties and neglecting 
business associations’ calls for social compromise, both left-of-the-centre (as well as 
right-of-the-centre) Republican parties tolerated or even stimulated the process of 
political radicalization. 
Particularly in the preceding months to the SCW, centre-of-the-spectrum forces 
allowed widespread violations of the rule of law, including illegal seizures or property, 
several waves of unpunished property destruction, impunity of criminal action for 
members of the parliamentary majority (Frente Popular) and hundreds or thousands of 
arbitrary political arrests. This represented a puzzle to understand for many groups of the 
time, chief among them business and landowners. While the confiscation of land without 
compensation “for reasons of social utility” was extended, one-sided labor terms 
increasingly onerous for business were imposed in many parts of the country. For 
instance, the six-hour workday (including the time spent travelling from home to the 
workplace) was established in the Seville province (Macarro Vera 2000, Payne 2006). In 
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some parts of the south, harvest wages doubled from 1935 to 1936 (Malefakis 1970). 
Some landowners associations, in many cases expressing unequivocal commitment to the 
Republican values, argued that the cost of harvest would exceed its value (Payne 2006, p. 
263). Yet their claims were ignored by the government. 
As a result, there was a widespread flight of many landowners from the country-
side. However, instead of take into account landowners’ complaints, the reaction of 
Republican government was to physically prevent the flight, restricting the issuing of 
passports and studying the measures proposed by the Socialists to require people to 
remain in their towns. This implied, in words of an opposition MP in the Cortes, 
“asserting a novel legal theory that inverted standard exiles and deportations, turning 
them inside out” (Macarro Vera 2000, p. 443). As Payne states, “landowners could not 
understand why the left Republican governments permitted such extremism and anarchy, 
since they considered the left Republicans, as Azaña considered himself, to be 
‘bourgeois’ and in favour of private property”(2006, p. 260). Most violations of property 
rights and the rule of law were undertaken by civil governorships and local councils in 
hands of the Socialists and not the more centre-oriented Left Republicans. Yet the Left 
Republicans controlling the central government did not make almost any use of the 
resources of the state apparatus in their hands in order to stop this process. The behaviour 
and attitude of the centre Republican governmental officials led by Azaña increasingly 
alienated its three main natural constituencies: middle and low army officers, social 
middle-classes and the foreign residents. As a result, these groups would ended up 
becoming pivotal supporters of Franco’s military rebellion. 
Regarding middle and low army officers, the episodes are too numerous as to 
explain at length, but two examples may illustrate the growing disaffection of the armed 
forces towards their political superiors. For instance, when the home of one army officer 
in Alcala de Henares was set fire by leftists in May 1936, the Prime Minister Casares 
Quiroga, himself a life-long protégée of Azaña, instead of prosecuting the fire 
perpetrators, ordered the army unit of the officer to move within two days. Similarly, in 
Oviedo, clashes between workers and Civil Guards (public security guards militarily 
organized) ended with the detention and prosecution of exclusively Civil Guards (Payne 
2006, p.265). 
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In his detailed account on the collapse of the Spanish Republic, Payne (2006) 
emphasizes that middle classes were one of the social groups who suffered the most the 
Frente Popular government that emerged from the February 1936 elections. Its major 
aim, according to Prime Minister Casares Quiroga in his inaugural speech in the 
parliament, would be “an all-out attack” against the “enemies” (of the Republic), who 
would eventually be “crushed”. The government would promote the politicization of 
justice and he added that “when it has to do with fascism, I will be unable to remain 
impartial. I declare to you that this government is belligerent against fascism” (Payne 
2006, p. 248). In a country where the official fascist party represented 0.5 percent of the 
electorate, it was obvious that the governmental classification of fascist could be 
arbitrarily extended to cover any social collective considered as dangeous. The religious 
middle-classes would become soon a main target. The minister of public instruction in 
Casares Quiroga’s government, Francisco Barnés, made of the closure of the religious 
congregations’ schools and of the illegal confiscation of private schools an official policy 
(Robinson 1970, p. 226). Not only priests, but also churchgoers were harassed and “were 
made to feel that it was unsafe to attend Mass” (Malefakis 1970, p. 374). Additionally, 
higher civil servants, such as judges and prosecutors, were forced to retire in a straight 
attack against the rule of law (Payne 2006; 252). Economically, the ambitious expansion 
of major budget categories (at a time in which public debt was skyrocketing) set by the 
1936 Republican government was severely criticized by the parliamentary opposition and 
eventually by the finance minister, Gabriel Franco. Unable to push through a sound 
progressive tax reform and to force his government peers to set priorities in public 
expenditures, Franco resigned (Payne 2006, p. 252).      
The economic and political disorder contributed to increase the fears of the 
foreign community in Spain. The representatives of several embassies – e.g. Argentina, 
Britain, Germany and the Netherlands – met already in April 1936 to coordinate asylum 
requests if the government could not prevent a revolutionary breakdown (Payne 2006, p. 
269). In particular, the assassination of the British director of a textile factory in 
Barcelona triggered the panic of British citizens in both Spain and Britain. These 
international doubts on the Spanish government’s ability (or will) to prevent a social 
revolution have extensively being explored, among others, in the works of Moradiellos 
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(1991), Payne (2006) or Little (1988) – the latter one with the illustrative title of “Red 
Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of the British Non-Intervention in the 
Spanish Civil War.” In sum, middle and low army officers, social middle-classes and 
foreign residents and investors, in the light of the systematic violations of impartiality and 
the rule of law, were increasingly abandoning their support for the Republican centre 
parties and in general for the institutions of the Republic. 
 
The Quality of Government Factor and the outbreak of Civil Wars 
This paper does not aim to answer all these puzzling behaviours among the Spanish 
Republican political elite, among other reasons because one cannot disregard the 
importance of irrational motivations in many politicians or, to the say the least, of an 
“extremely bounded” rationality in a large number of them.5 Nevertheless, this paper 
argues here that institutional factors can be more convincing than psychological ones in 
this case, since the willingness to curb the rule of law to remain in power – at the risk of 
the ignition of a civil war – cut across all the Spanish political elite, unlike what 
happened in the relatively similar Sweden.  
There seems to be a systematic pattern in the way politicians who “touched 
power” behaved in office and we argue that this could have had a decisive role in 
transforming the Spain’s social conflicts into a violent confrontation. Republican 
incumbents seemed to give an overwhelming preference to party interests over basic 
respect for the rule of law and, in particularly, they seemed to prioritize the 
implementation of policies that maximized the delivery of targeted clientelistic policies 
and the occupation of all sort of positions in the entire state politico-administrative 
apparatus. Unlike their European counterparts, the access to power gave Spanish 
incumbents access also to a long list of administrative positions to fill with party zealots, 
                                                 
5 In particular, the probably most powerful and charismatic figure during the Republic, Azaña, exhibited 
frequently such a degree of blindness to basic empirical evidence that it is almost impossible not to give 
partial credit to explanations based on his megalomaniac personality traits for the demise of Republican 
institutions.  For example, he was frequently recalled that if no significant shift of policy was undertaken, 
uncontrollable violent leftish revolution and/or an equally violent military uprising would be the most 
likely outcome in just a few months. Socialist newspapers, like Claridad, regularly reminded him of his 
role as a “Spanish Kerenski”. One major reason for this Azaña’s apparently naïve behaviour would lie in a 
personality defined by fellow ministers at the time, like Miguel Maura, as “pitiless in his judgements of 
others and their actions (Maura 1968, p. 223) and by recent scholars as “aloof, acerbic and arrogant” 
(Payne 2006, p. 15).     
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cronies or members of clientelistic networks. The extensive politicization of the 
bureaucracy was the result of the particular design of the Spanish administrative state, 
which took shape during the 19th century, and specially during the second-half, 
considered by most administrative scholars as a critical juncture in the formation of most 
Western states (e.g. see Silberman 1993, North, Wallis & Weingast 2009, Rothstein 
2009). 
We also follow here a recent trend in the research on the outbreak of civil wars. 
Generally speaking, one can detect a shift in focus in the comparative literature on the 
causes of civil conflicts: the emphasis has moved from socio-economic charateristics to 
the characteristics of the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier 2009, Öberg and 
Melander 2009, Rothstein 2009b). These scholars are pointing at the character of the state 
as an important reason for why civil wars start in some settings and not in others. The 
lack of impartiality in the implementation of laws and policies – considered in the 
literature as the defining element of “quality of government” (Rothstein & Teorell (2008) 
– is seen as a major factor for explaining civil wars.  
For example, in his analysis of the outbreak of the Civil War in former 
Yugoslavia, Rothstein shows that the Serb minority in the then newly created Croatian 
state initially accepted their role as a minority given that their civil rights would be 
respected by the new government. The radicalization of the Serb minority in Croatia that 
escalated into violence and the following civil war, took place as a response to a set of 
major violations of the principles of the rule-of-law, of equal protection under the law 
and respect for the minority rights that the Serb minority interpreted as real threats to 
their lives and their possibility to coexist in the new Croatian state. The argument is that 
it is not being outvoted in elections that will destroy the legitimacy of the political order 
in the eyes of the losing minority. Instead, it is if they have reason to fear that the winning 
side will use their powers to destroy the state impartiality in its exercise of power. If 
belonging to minority not only implies that your influence of the enactment of new 
policies will be very low, but if it also implies you can not count on being protected by 
the police, on be given an equal chance to apply for public contracts and government jobs 
or on getting a fair and impartial treatment by courts and other public authorities that 
 21
your livelihood depends on, then legitimacy breaks down and the result may be civil 
strife that can escalate to full blown civil war (Rothstein 2009).  
According to Payne (2004, 2006), as well as Beevor (2009)  this is what happened 
during the popular front government in Spain and what later drove the middle class into 
the arms of rightist insurrection. As Payne writes: “by refusing to enforce the law equally 
and by intensifying its policy of harassment of the right, the time would come when many 
moderate conservatives would be willing to ally themselves with the radical right"” 
(2006. p. 365). Moreover, "it was impossible for the opposition to obtain honest 
government and equal enforcement of the law" (ibid). This list of violations of the 
principles of impartiality and equal protection under the rule of law by the popular front 
government would include, according to Payne, the following:  
• Illegal seizures of property 
• Several thousand arbitrary police arrests of members of rightist parties 
• Impunity of criminal action for members of Popular Front parties 
• The politization of justice through new legislation and policies, in order to 
facilitate arbitrary political arrests and prosecution and to place the rightist parties 
outside the law 
• Subversion of the security forces through reappointment of revolutionary police 
officers earlier prosecuted for their violent and subversive actions 
Obviously some of the targets of these violations of the rule of law were either 
relatives or fellow party members of the relatively “bourgeois” government parties. In 
those cases, and basically only in those cases, Casares Quiroga’s government acted. As 
Payne (2006, p.260) shows, the government only protected the small and medium 
landowners who were members of the Republicans parties instead of forcefully applying 
the law (Payne 2006, p.260). The key figures in the protection of the interests and private 
property of the Republican parties extensive clientelistic networks were the politically 
appointed provincial civil governors, who enjoyed a wide array of mechanisms at their 
disposal, including the replacement of local councils and the discretionary control of the 
security forces.  
It is interesting to compare the situation in 1936 Spain with the current “democracies 
in dangerous places” analyzed by Paul Collier (2009). His explanation of the standard 
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violent breakdown of democracy in a stereotypical “bottom billion” country could be 
applied to 1936 Spain: “if there are no limits on the power of the winner, the election 
becomes a matter of life and death. If this life-and-death struggle is not itself subject to 
rules of conduct, the contestants are driven to extremes. The result is not democracy: it 
think of it as democrazy” (2009, p.17). In Spain the government, first, hardly had limits to 
appoint hundreds of positions in the central administration and, thanks to the politically 
dependent position of civil governor, could replace many positions at local level. In the 
second place, there were no limits to the governmental capacity to create new positions in 
the state apparatus – such as the Assault Guards – who were politically driven. These 
Republican guards would play a decisive role in most of the violations of the rule of law 
during the Republic and in particular in the dramatic events of July 12th, when a group of 
assault guards (specifically the socialist militant Luis Cuenca) killed the political leader 
of the Spanish right Calvo Sotelo.6 In sum, for the hundreds or thousands of members of 
the parties in government who obtained a salary from the public budget, consolidating 
themselves in power was much more decisive than for the members of equivalent 
European parties, who, on the contrary, could not aim to occupy positions in the state 
apparatus. 
It is at precisely at this point that it is interesting to compare the radicalization of 
PSOE in the 1930s with its Swedish “sister party”, the SAP, which came to power in a 
coalition government in 1933. Not only did the SAP respect the impartiality principles of 
the state and ruled within full respect of the equal protection under the rule of law 
principles. The party leadership had since long taken a very firm stance against the 
opposite type of programmatic ideas launched by communists and anarchists. One reason 
for that law-abiding behaviour was that the SAP and their close allies in the union 
movement had no reason to fear that the right wing parties, when in power, would part 
from impartiality, meritocracy and equal protection under the rule of law as guiding 
principles for the Swedish bureaucracy. After gaining power in 1933, the SAP faced a 
situation with very high levels of industrial disputes, strikes and lockouts on the labour 
                                                 
6 By profession, Calvo Sotelo was a high civil servant, a state lawyer, who, during Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship represented the “technocratic” or bureaucratic developmentalist side of the authoritarian 
regime. In other words, if Calvo Sotelo’s assassination can obviously be interpreted as the assassination of 
a rightist by a leftist (Luis Cuenca), it can also be seen as the assassination of a bureaucrat by a politically 
appointee. 
 23
market. Although in principle siding with their close allies in the union  movement, the 
SAP leader Per-Albin Hansson made very clear that the unions could not use any illegal 
measures in these conflicts, for example physically attacking the much hated strike-
breakers which were often organized by employers’ organizations. In a statement in the 
Swedish Parliament in 1935 commenting on such incidences, Hansson made it very clear 
that none of the parties, not even his allies in the union movement, stood above the law 
and that he would enforce necessary measures to keep things under the law (Rothstein 
2005). In Hansson’s own word to the Parliament: “For my part, I have on many occasions 
explained that the trade union movement must, like other powers in society, subordinate 
itself to the common interest, and must accommodate itself to the general sense of 
justice.”7 
In these heated times in Sweden as well as in the rest of Europe (not least in 
Germany!), the leaders of the SAP thus sent a very different signal to his political 
opponents than did his fellow Socialist party leader in the PSOE. In sum, the Swedish 
SAP decided to put class interests under the rule of law, while Largo Caballero and the 
PSOE – to a greater extent – and Azaña and the Left Republicans – to a lesser extent –  
chose the opposite strategy. Secondly, the SAP thought that having industrial relations 
that did not escalate into open conflicts was a “common interest”, the PSOE had a 
different strategy expressed in the following way in its leading paper: “Harmony? No! 
Class War! Hatred of the Criminal Bourgeoise to the Death” (Beevor 2006, p 31). Why 
did one Socialist Party opt for a compromise strategy and the other one for a civil war 
(even if not sure of winning it)? Our answer would be the counterfactual we present here, 
namely the character of the state as an organization. If the state will be guided by the 
principles of impartiality and equal protection under the rule of law, the side that loses an 
election and becomes the minority does not lose “everything” because its followers and 
allied organizations still have the protection of the rule of law and the impartiality 
principles. However, if the state does not operate under these principles, the losing side 
risks “everything.” In such a situation, agents may see no alternative than to go for total 
confrontation.  
  
                                                 
7 Records of the Swedish Parliament, Second Chamber 1935 - 4:12. 
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Swedish Bureaucratic Autonomy versus Spanish Politicization 
We argue here that 1930s Sweden, where political incumbents (e.g. Socialist SAP 
ministers) were unable to replace at will public employees down in the chain of 
command, would neatly fit as well in the category of powerful administration as defined 
by Greif (2007). Powerful administrators act as a check that prevents rulers from 
predating and violating the rule of law. It is the counter-balancing power of autonomous 
administrators, and not the enactment of formal constitutions, what would explain the 
triumph of the rule of law in England and other Modern European countries (Greif 2007, 
González de Lara, Greif and Jha 2008). On the contrary, public employees in 1930s 
Spain were what Greif defines as weak administrators (or ruler-controlled 
administrations); that is, mere instruments in the executive’s hands who would not pose 
resistance to the attempts to curb the rule of law in order to benefit government’s interest 
groups.  
As a result of the consolidation of a coalition of merit-based autonomous 
bureaucrats in Sweden during the late 19th century, the Swedish state was able to resist 
the posterior intense attempts by both far-right and far-left political incumbents to, first, 
politicize the administrative apparatus with political appointees and, second, to 
subordinate rule of law to class interests during the polarized interwar period. At the time 
of the introduction of representational democracy (1908-1917), the Swedish 
administrative state was already in hands of a coalition of autonomous bureaucrats with 
the technical skills and the cohesion to resist attempts of politicization. Interestingly, 
Swedish bureaucrats did not enter the political game and, since then, they have been both 
formally and informally precluded to take part in active politics. Hence it is not only that 
politicians did not occupy administrative positions, but bureaucrats could not become 
politicians either. This is in sharp contrast with Spain where bureaucrats not only could 
engage in active politics, but they became leading figures in several parties. 
In historical comparative terms, Sweden presents one of the most clear-cut 
separations of politics and administration (Dahlstrom & Lapuente 2009, 2010). In the 
first place, there is hardly “politicization from above” – that is, politicians do not occupy 
positions reserved to bureaucrats. Secondly, the level of “politicization from below” – 
that is, bureaucrats having themselves a political career and eventually becoming party 
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leaders – has also been very low. In sharp contrast, Spain represents, in comparative 
terms, one of the Western examples with a higher degree of integration of politics and 
administration. Not only there have traditionally been a large numbers of the 
administrative layers of the state apparatus occupied by political appointees 
(politicization from above), but it is also remarkable the extremely high proportion of 
civil servants among the elites of major political parties (politicization from below).  
The unions and the Swedish Social Democratic party came to appreciate and 
make use of the states’ impartiality during this crucial period (Rothstein 1992, Rothstein 
2005). By taking part on an equal footing with the employers’ federation in various 
corporatist boards an agencies organized by the state, the non-communist left came to 
realize the value of this system for their own political interests.  Starting already in 1903, 
numerous such corporatist bodies dealing with issues such as the implementation of 
social insurance schemes, work safety regulations, mediations in industrial disputes and 
the operation of local labour exchanges were established (Rothstein 1992, 2005). The 
strength of the meritocratic and rule-of-law oriented bureaucracy was also increased 
because of the self-interest and “corps-de-esprit” of the bureaucrats themselves. This 
group certainly had a vested interest in the state to remain impartial given that their future 
professional careers (which excluded the possibility of engaging in active politics) 
depended on that.  
In the increasingly politicized years of the interwar Europe, the Swedish civil 
service was thus able to remain as an impartial or neutral power “above politics”, using 
the term coined by Miller (2000). On the contrary, in Spain the continuity of the “spoils 
system” until at least the enactment of the 1918 Civil Service Act (Jiménez-Asensio 
1989: 253), that is, long after the establishment of the male universal suffrage (1890), 
together with the high fragmentation of the relatively few merit-based administrative 
bodies made the Spanish state permeable to extensive politicization. The politically-
appointed (or non-cohesive merit-recruited) public employees, especially those in the 
state security apparatus, had a vested interest not in keeping impartiality, but in providing 
policies as “partial” as possible. In other words, the Spanish state, or at least very 
significant bits of it, remained not above, but “under politics”. 
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In 1936 the politicization of the state with loyal supporters (including extensive 
purges) was much more extensive than the autonomy of bureaucracy. The failure to 
consolidate in Spain what Shefter (1977) defines as a “coalition for bureaucratic 
autonomy” should be traced back to 1812. Before that, and specially during the 18th 
century, Spain, like France and Prussia, started to develop several autonomous 
administrative bodies which enjoyed a notable degree of autonomy from monarchs’ 
interventions. Yet the Napoleonic invasion produced a disruption of the traditional 
administrative structure, and a new type of public administration emerged when the 1812 
liberal Constitution of Cadiz was enacted. It was based on an extensive use of the spoils 
system, which was known in Spain as the cesantia system (Jiménez-Asensio 1989:42; 
Parrado 2000:252). 
Although the Spanish 19th century presents a scenario of perpetuated failures to 
install a liberal system, a mechanism of manipulating elections was being improved 
under the different monarchs. The perfection came during the Restoration (1876-1923), 
where Canovas del Castillo crafted a peaceful system of alternating control through 
which his Conservative party and the Liberals could rotate in power thanks to a tacit 
acceptation of electoral manipulation. This alternation was called the turno pacifico and it 
has been often praised for achieving its goal of replacing the military coup as the main 
instrument of political change in Spain (Carr 1980, p.8) and in general for bringing 
stability to Spain (Payne 2006). Its pernicious consequences in terms of state building 
have in turn been clearly overlooked. 
The universal male suffrage was introduced in 1890, but the overall government 
control over the electoral results from above did not disappear. The electoral 
manipulation was done through, first, the Civil Governors of each province and, second, 
the caciques or local political bosses, employed by each of the two parties in order to 
secure for itself a comfortable majority in the Cortes. These figures created their 
clienteles by delivering jobs in the public sector. Backed by the civil governors, caciques 
handed out all type of jobs within a given territory: from night watchman to judge (Carr, 
1980, p11). To do this the cacique had a total control over municipalities and judgeships 
and it was essential that every electoral contest was preceded by a massive change of 
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mayors and local judges. The electoral manipulation was so high that the electoral results 
were at some point published in the press before polling day (Carr 1980, p.12).  
All throughout the 19th century therefore employees’ asset which was most 
required by governments was “electoral loyalty to a party”, in particular to a certain 
stream within the party, and very especially to some political bosses (Nieto 1996, p390-
1). Civil servants were mostly considered as an ‘impact force’ of the government party. 
In order to show they were complying and not shirking, and in order to intimidate voters 
of opposition parties, civil servants used to vote in groups and sometimes to decorate 
their uniforms to make their electoral choice more evident (Parrado 2000:252; Jimenez 
Asensio 1989:155; Varela Ortega 1977:415). In the second place, their function was to 
mobilize friends and relatives to vote –the possession of a large family able to vote being 
the main asset for a civil servant.8 The Count of Romanones, who was 17 times minister 
and 3 times Prime Minister, openly recognized that the elections were not won by 
providing public policies for the citizenry, but by offering jobs and having friends 
(Romanones 1934:71). 
A key administrative position in the partial behavior of governments during the 
Republic was, as we have seen, the Civil Governors in each province. The Minister of the 
Interior Javier de Burgos created in 1830 the Spanish provincias which would be the 
equivalent of the French administrative territorial division (department). To head the 
provincias Javier de Burgos set up a new administrative officer -the subdelegado de 
gobierno (soon latter renamed as Civil Governor)- who would play the same role as the 
French prefect. But while the latter had a professional profile and soon achieved 
bureaucratic autonomy from politicians, the Spanish gobernador civil, on the contrary, 
was subject to the general spoils system existing in the administration. Contrary to the 
technocratic profile of the French prefects, who belonged to the prestigious prefectural 
corps, the primary – and sometimes unique – function of the gobernador civil was “to 
milk votes” (Garcia de Enterria 1961:55). Had a Spanish prefectural corps been installed 
in the 1830s, it would, to the very least, have been difficult to imagine some the most 
evident abuses of the rule of law in 1936, tolerated, if not directly encouraged by 
                                                 
8 El Empleado 4-4-1887. Initially a means of expression of public employees’ views, El Empleado became 
a leading political journal at the time, emphasizing many of the negative consequences of a patronage-
based administration. 
 28
politically appointed Civil Governors who did not represent the professional (or 
corporatist) view of an administrative corps, but the ruling parties’ interests. 
The spoils system would officially end with the enactment of the 1918 Civil 
Service Act, with which Prime Minister’s Maura government granted stability to most 
public employees in order to consolidate their loyalty in the uncertain political and social 
circumstances of the time (Nieto 1986, p.315). Yet the key position of Civil 
Governorship or those related to the security forces remained highly politicized. For 
example, the local governor of Barcelona General Martínez Anido ruled the city at will 
from 1920 to 1922 (Carr 1980:90). More than relying on traditional police repression, 
Martinez Anido trusted the counter-terror of the ‘yellow’ Free Syndicates, organized by 
his own police chief, thus violating all principles of a neutral Weberian administration. 
Even more clearly, dictator Primo de Rivera “behaved as a sultan administering 
justice at the town’s gates” (Ben Ami (1983, p.74). To start with, he appointed and 
dismissed judges at will (Villacorta 1989:57). Not only did he control most nominations 
to high civil service offices, but, through a series of decrees in 1926, he put his 
government above any legal restraints (Carr 1982: 583). Accordingly, government could 
impose administrative and disciplinary sanctions, even when they contradicted existing 
laws and regulations (Jiménez de Asua 1930:95). Another decree allowed the government 
to suspend the verdicts of the Supreme Court (Ben Ami 1983:101). In Primo de Rivera’s 
own words, “the very essence of a dictatorship is (…) while responding to circumstantial 
imperatives, to prefer the supremacy of the executive power over any other. A 
dictatorship ought never to be accountable for breach of the law”.9 Regarding public 
employees, in spite of the prevailing legislation, the spoils system – who had been 
abolished in 1918 – was readopted during the beginning of the dictatorship by purges 
(Parrado 2000:254). Regarding the security forces, Primo re-established the Somatén, a 
sort of special armed police reserve. Later on, its Minister of the Interior, the former 
governor of Barcelona General Martínez Anido, renewed and widened for the whole 
country his old alliance with the ‘yellow’ Free Syndicates that he had successfully 
implemented in Barcelona (Carr 1982:570). 
                                                 
9 Quoted in Ben Ami (1983, 101-102) 
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Thus, the PSOE and the rest of the Republican forces had little reason to believe 
that, when in power, their political opponents would respect universalism, impartiality 
and the rule of law principles so why should they? In contrast, the Swedish state had been 
dominated by a largely uncorrupt and “enlightened” civil service corps adhering to 
Weberian ideals since the mid 19th century (Rothstein 1998). As a matter of fact, the 
politicization of the public administration was put on the agenda of the Republic even 
before the democratic institutions were fully operating. So, the provisional government 
who seized power after the departure of the king in 1931 issued the Act for the Defense 
of the Republic, which already in its first article partially suppressed secure tenure for 
those civil servants who showed “lack of zeal and negligence”.10 The Act was 
deliberately ambiguous to give wide margin of maneuver to politicians to judge on case-
by-case bases (Jiménez-Asensio 1989:312). Despite there are no written records of 
dismissals, and therefore we lack solid evidence on whether this Act was really 
implemented (Ballvé 1983:329; Jiménez-Asensio 1989:312), the politicization of the 
administration, specially regarding the civil governorships and the security forces was 
extremely acute (Payne 2006). 
 
Democracy and State Building – the Importance of Sequencing 
Following Shefter’s (1977) thesis on the emergence of bureaucracies, in 19th century 
Sweden, the moment of mass politics came after the consolidation of a coalition for 
bureaucratic autonomy and the establishment of a Weberian state. The socialist party was 
“externally mobilized” in Sweden since it had to grow within the boundaries of an 
authoritarian regime, that is, in regimes where there were no opportunities for the party to 
become a member of the government. The implication is that the Swedish party (like the 
German and Austrian socialist parties) could not resort to a patron-client pattern of 
exchange with their supporters. They could not tell their would-be militants: we will offer 
you a public job. This meant that the Swedish type of socialist party had to offer a 
programmatic strategy built on a combination of socialist ideas and the protection of 
workers’ and unions’ interests instead of patronage jobs and clientelistic policies. In the 
meantime, within the (authoritarian) state an increasing powerful strata started to 
                                                 
10 Article 1, Ley de Defensa de la Republica.  
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consolidate its position: the autonomous high civil servants recruited in a meritocratic 
way. Mass democracy would come later and male universal suffrage was not established 
until 1911. In addition, the Swedish state remained firmly in the hands of the Crown, with 
not only civil servants but also ministers being formally appointed by the monarch. The 
first minister ever not being appointed by the Crown was in 1905.  
This situation contrasts sharply with that of Spain during the crucial decades of 
the late 19th century. Politicians like Canovas, and even more his liberal counterpart 
Sagasta (known as the “old shepherd”, because of his abilities to control his huge flock of 
cronies), were able to appoint thousands of positions in the state apparatus, from central 
ministerial offices in Madrid to the most remote village in the geography. Unlike 
Sweden, in 19th century Spain (as well as the US and  Italy), the moment of mass politics 
came before the building of a coalition for bureaucratic autonomy. Socialists or left 
parties emerged in here in a “Jacksonian type” democracy and they could establish 
patron-client deals with supporters: if you support me, I can offer you a job in the 
administration. Bureaucratic autonomy with the 1918 Civil Service Act came too late, 
was too piecemeal, and it too fragile, as the examples of Primo de Rivera’s and the 
Republican Governments’ politicizations show. There was not in place a civil service 
elite who could counterbalance politicians’ attempts to curb the rule of law. 
 In sum, during the second half of the 19th century, the preservation of a mostly 
unaccountable to politicians state administration allowed the creation of a coalition for 
bureaucratic autonomy formed by increasingly meritocratic civil servants in Sweden. 
This coalition was able to keep the impartiality of the Swedish state in the decades to 
come. On the contrary, the existence of a state administration highly accountable to 
politicians in Spain during the 19th century prevented the formation of a coalition of 
meritocratic autonomous bureaucrats who could have resisted the attempts of 
politicization and who could have also played a mediation role in the social conflicts of 
the interwar period. In sum, in 1936 Spain was not, comparatively speaking, lacking 
governmental capacity. Quite the opposite, the Spanish executives had too much 
governmental capacity in the sense that they was not counter-balanced by a strong body 
or bodies of administrators who could prevent the politicization (of personnel and 
policies) and the increasing curbing of the rule of law. 
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